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[So F. No. 19451. In Bank. June 19,1956.] 
FREDERICK SHEETS LORENZ, Appellant, V. BOARD 
OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS, Respondent. 
[1] Physicians-Licenses-Revocation-Oonviction of Orime In-
volving Moral Turpitude.-Under the plain language of Bus. 
& Prof. Code, § 2383, it is the conviction alone of an offense 
involving moral turpitude that empowers the Board of Medical 
Examiners to suspend or cancel a physician's license, and since 
the record of conviction is conclusive evidence of the unpro-
fessional conduct, the circumstances in which the crime was in 
fact committeu cannot be considered. 
l2] Id. - Licenses - Revocation - Oonviction of Orime Involving 
Moral Turpitude.-Moral turpitude must be inherent in the 
crime itself to warrant cancellation or suspension of a physi-
cian's license because of a conviction of the crime; it is not 
inherent in the crime unless a conviction in every case would, 
evidence bad moral character. Onlv if the minimum elements' 
for a conviction necessarily involve "moral turpitude and a con- i 
viction cannot be had without proof of facts showing moral 
turpitude, can the conviction be held to be of an offense 
involving moral turpitude. 
[3) Id.-Licenses-Revocation-Oonviction of Orime Involving 
Moral Tnrpitude.-The offense of giving an alcoholic beverage 
to a person under the age of 21 years does not in every ease 
evidence bad moral character, and moral turpitude is therefore 
not inherent in the crime itself; hence conviction alone of 
such an offense does not warrant suspension or cancellation of a 
physician's license under BUi>. & Prof. Code, § 2383. (Dis-
approvin~ Brainard v. State Board of MedicaZ Examiners, 68 
Cn1.App.2d 591, 157 P.2d 7.) 
[1] See Oal.Jur., Physicians and Surgeons, § 10 et seq.; Am.Jur., 
Physicians and Surgeons, § 44 et seq. 
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Id.-Licenses-Revocation-tI"nprofessional Oonduct.-lf other 
acts committed at the same time as the offense for which a 
licensee is convicted constitute unprofessional misconduct 
(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2377 et seq.) the licensee may be disci-
plined therefor, but he must be charged with such acts. 
Id. - Licenses - Revocation - Oonviction of Orime Involving 
Moral 'l'urpitude.-An offense· that does not necessarily in· 
volve moral turpitude may be committed by an act involving 
moral turpitude, in which case a licensee cannot be disciplined 
under a procedure that makes the record of conviction con-
clusive evidence of unprofessional conduct, but must be 
charged with the fraudulent or immoral act and given a hear-
ing on that charge. 
ld.-Licenses-Disciplinary Proceedings.-If disciplinary pro-
ceedings are to be had against a physician for unprofessional 
conduct in connection with his violation of the Alcoholic Bev-
erage Act, they must be initiated by those charged with that 
responsibility. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City and County of San Francisco. Harry J. Neubarth, 
Judge. Reversed with directions. 
Proceeding in mandamus to review an order of the Board 
of Medical Examiners revoking a physician's license. Judg-
ment denying writ, reversed with directions. 
Lowell L. Dryden, Denison, Dietrich & Anderson and Butch-
inson & Quattrin for Appellant. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and Dan Kaufmann, 
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-on October 3, 1952, judgment of conviction 
was entered on petitioner's plea of guilty to a violation of 
section 61, subdivision (a), (If the Alcoholic Beverage C(lntrol 
Actl (now Bus. & Pr(lf. Code, § 25658). On April 9, 1953, a 
special investigator for the Board of Medical Examiners filed 
with the boara an accusation against petitioner (Gov. Code, 
§ 11503) chargi,ng that his conviction was for an offense in-
volving moral turpitude and that he was therefore guilty of 
1" Every person who sells, furnishes, gives or causes to be 801d, fur· 
nished, or given away. any alcoholic beverage to any person under the 
age of 21 years is guilty of a misdemeanor." 
) 
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unprofessional conduct under sections 2361' and 23838 of the 
Business and Professions Code. It was also alleged that on or 
about March 13, 1947, petitioner's license had been revoked 
for conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, but that. 
the revocation was suspended and petitioner placed on pro-
bation for five years. 
A hearing was held before a hearing officer on February 23, 
1954. He found that discipline had been previously imposed 
as alleged, that the conviction in question was for giving a 
drink of an alcoholic beverage to a 17-year-old boy, but that 
the crime did not involve moral turpitude. He recommended 
that the accusation be dismissed. The Board of Medical Ex-
aminers, however, decided that petitioner had been convicted 
of a crime involving moral turpitude and revoked his license 
to practice medicine and surgery in California. 
Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of mandate in the 
superior court to review the order of the board (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 1094.5) and a trial was had on the record before 
the board. The court found that ". . . said conviction was 
of a crime involving moral turpitude in that it arose from 
the furnishing of intoxicating liquor by the petitioner on or 
about August 17, 1952 at the Travelodge Motel in Brawley, 
California, to a minor ... without just cause or explanation, 
and that at said time and place and in connection with the 
furnishing of said intoxicating liquor the petitioner did 
engage in immoral acts with the said minor" and entered its 
order discharging the alternative writ. Petitioner appeals. 
[1] Under the plain language of section 2383 it is the 
conviction alone of an offense involving moral turpitude that 
empowers the board to suspend or cancel a license. Since the 
record of conviction is conclusive evidence of the unprofes-
sional conduct, the circumstances in which the crime was in 
fact committed cannot be considered. [2] Moral turpitude 
must be inherent in the crime itself to warrant cancellation 
or suspension of a license because of the conviction. (In 
re Hallinan, 43 Cal.2d 243, 248-249 [272 P.2d 768].) Moral 
turpitude is not inherent in the crime itself unless a con-
'''The board shall take action against any holder of a certificate, who 
ill guilty of unprofessional conduct .••• " Business and Professions 
Code, ~ 2377 et 8eq., specify those acts which constitute unprofessional 
conduct. 
'''The conviction of a felony, or of any offense involving moral 
turpitude, constitutes unprofessional conduct within the meaning of this 
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-nction in every ease would evidence bad moral character. 
(Ibid.) Only if the minimum elements for a conviction neces-
sarily involve moral turpitude and a conviction cannot be had 
without proof of facts showing moral turpitude, can the con-
viction be held to be of an offense involving moral turpitude. 
(Ibid.) 
[3] We have concluded that the offense of giving an alco-
holic beverage to a person under the age of 21 years does 
not in every case evidence a bad moral character and that 
moral turpitude is therefore not inherent in the crime itself. 
Conviction alone, therefore, of such an offense does not war-
rant the suspension or cancellation of a license under section 
2383. Brainard v. State Board of Medical Examiflers, 68 Cal. 
App.2d 591 [157 P.2d 7}, permitting inquiry into collateral 
acts to determine whether a conviction was for an offense 
involving moral turpitude is inconsistent with our opinion 
herein and is disapproved. 
[4] If other acts committed at the same time as the offense 
for which a licensee is convicted constitute unprofessional 
conduct (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 2377 et seq.) the licensee may 
be disciplined for those acts. He must, however, be charged 
with such acts. (In re Hess, 45 CaUd 171 [288 P.2d 5].) In 
the present case petitioner was neither charged nor convicted 
of anything but a violation of section 61(a) of the Alcoholic 
Beverage Control Act. 
[5] An offense that does not necessarily involve moral tur-
pitude may be committed by an act involving moral turpitUde, 
e g. section 145, subdivision (b), of the Internal Revenue 
(,ode may be violated by intentional fraud (see In re HalUnan, 
supra, 43 Cal.2d 243, 253) ; section 61, subdivision (a), of the 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act may be violated by adulterat-
ing a nonalcoholic drink with alcohol and inducing a minor 
to take it in the belief that it is nonalcoholic. In such eases 
a licensee cannot be disciplined under a procedure that makes 
the record of conviction conclusive evidence of unprofessional 
conduct, but must be charged with the fraudulent or immoral 
act and given a hearing on that charge. Petitioner was not 
charged with such an act and there is nothing in the record 
to indicate any deception or other immoral act in the giving 
of the alcoholic beverage. 
[6] If further proceedings are to be had against petitioner 
for unprofessional conduct in connection with his violation of 
the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act they must be initiated 
) 
) 
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by those charged with that responsibility. (Of. I'll re Hallinan, 
.upra, 43 Cal.2d 243, 253-254.) 
The judgment is reversed with instructions to the trial 
court to grant a peremptory writ of mandate directing the 
board to set aside its order of revocation. 
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., Spence,J., and 
McComb, J., concurred. 
SHENK, J., Dissenting.-The judgment is reversed on the 
ground that the crime of which the plaintiff was convicted 
(furnishing intoxicating liquor to a minor) does not neces-
sarily involve moral turpitude and that in order to disclose 
the circumstances of sex perversion in connection with that 
crime it would be necessary independently to charge the plain-
tiff with, and prove, that particular crime. 
I cannot agree with the circuitous course required by the 
court under the circumstances of this case. Dr. Lorenz was 
cited to answer to the charge of which he had been convicted. 
Be appeared before the hearing officer to answer the charge. 
Be was represented by connsel. The board was also repre-
sented. The judgment of conviction was conclusive evidence 
of that conviction. The board proceeded to inquire into the 
circumstances surrounding the conduct of the doctor in com-
mitting the crime of which he had been convicted. In my 
opinion the board had the power to do so. Those circum-
stances might disclose no moral turpitude. They might dis-
close conduct amounting to moral turpitude but not consti-
tuting a separate criminal offense or they might show an 
offense against the criminal laws of the state. If they tended 
to disclose any conduct involving moral turpitude the accused 
doctor should, in fairness, be given an adequate opportunity 
to meet the charge. Such an opportunity was accorded him 
in this case. When the board proceeded to inquire into the 
homosexual conduct of the accused doctor his counsel stated: 
"We know and we anticipated that we would have to meet 
this type of charge [homosexual conduct] here ... So we 
selected the two outstanding men in the field of neuro-psy-
chiatry as involves homosexual behavior that we could find, 
and we had him [the accused doctor] examined. Those same 
two doctors . . . tell you out and out frankly across the 
board that Dr. Lorenz is not a homosexual and there is nothing 
that would militate against his continuing his practice." 
) 
) 
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An objection was made to the introduction of evidence show-
ing homosexual conduct but no objection was made on the 
ground that the accused doctor was taken hy surprise or had 
no notice that the subject would be investigated. No request 
for a continuance was made to enable him to further combat 
the charge. In contesting it he introduced evidence of experts 
to prove that he was of good character and not homosexually 
inclined. 
The record supports the conclusion of the board that the 
purpose of plying the boy with liquor was in furtherance 
of the accused doctor's homosexual intentions and that they 
were carried into effect. I see no good reason to require the 
roundabout way of proving in an independent action what 
has already been disclosed. After the administrative hearing 
the accused doctor resorted to the court under established 
practice to have the order of the board set aside. After a 
court hearing the action of the board was upheld. There was 
no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in refus-
ing the aid of the court to relieve the accused of the conse-
quences of his reprehensible conduct. I would affirm the 
judgment. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied July 18, 
1956. Shenk, J., was of the opinion that the petition should 
be granted. 
